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Summary findings
Providing  a more complete  framework  for assessing  the  criteria are met is determined  by the way transaction
efficiency  of government  intervention  requires moving  costs  are minimized,  which  in turn drives  the design  of
away from the idealistic  perspective  typically  found in  the regulatory  framework.
the normative  approach  to traditional  public  economics,  In practice,  for example,  if there are commitment
contend Estache  and Martimort.  Such  a move  requires  problems,  short-term  institutional  contracts  between
viewing  the government  not as a monolithic  entity but as  players  are more likely  to ensure  autonomy  and
many different  government  bodies,  each  with its own  independence.  This  affects  the duration of th-e
constituency  and regulatory  tools.  nomination  of the regulators.  Short-term  contracts  may
Not only is the "multitiered"  government  limited  in its  be best, but contracts  for regulators  typically  last four to
ability  to commit,  but interest groups  influence  the  eight  years and are often renewable.
regulatory  process  and impose  significant  transaction  The empirical  debate  about the design  of regulators'
costs  on government  interventions  and on their outcome.  jobs is a possible  source  of tension.  Practitioners  typically
Estache  and Martimort discuss  the nature of those  recommend  choosing  regulators  based on professional
transaction  costs  and argue that the overall  design  of the  rather than political  criteria,  but that may not be the best
government  is the result of their minimization.  Among  way to minimize  regulatory  capture. Professional  experts
the points  they make in their conclusions:  are likely  to come  from the sector they are supposed  to
- Safeguards  built into regulatory  contracts  sometimes  regulate  and are likely  to return to it sooner or later (as
reflect  and sometimes  imply  transactions  costs  which  typically  happens  in developing  countries).  On the other
influence,  or should influence,  the optimal  tradeoff  hand, elected  regulators  are unlikely  to be much more
between  rent and efficient  in ways  practitioners  independent  than professional  regulators;  they will
sometimes  ignore.  simply  represent different  interests.
- Most of the literature  on transaction  costs  arising  Practitioners  and theorists  alike emphasize  different
from government  failures  would agree  that to be  sources  of capture and agree  that one way to deal with
sustainable,  regulatory  institutions  should  be  its risk  is to make sure the selection  process  involves  both
independent,  autonomous,  and accountable.  How these  executive  and legislative  branches.
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With the wave of infrastructure privatization that has spread throughout the world, many
countries are working on the creation of new regulatory institutions to monitor the behavior and
performance of their newly privatized infrastructure monopolies. Little conceptual work has been done
on the optimal design of these new institutions.  To try to improve our understanding of what this design
should take into account, it seems reasonable to try to review the work on organizational design that
grew from developments in principle-agent theory in the 1980's and draw some policy lessons.  In this
literature, regulation is generally viewed as a game between various players with different degrees of
knowledge and information required to make the choices that lead to the efficient and fair allocation of
resources.  The understanding of the incentive problems underlying these games provides some useful
lessons on the optimal design of the regulatory regime.  But this is not enough.  We also need to
improve our understanding of the internal organization of the government to assess the importance of
the institutions responsible for the implementation of these regimes.
To progress in this direction and provide better analytical support for the recommendations
made by practitioners, we have to move away from the standard normative approach, which has been
the cornerstone of the economics of the public sector so far.  In the standard normative context, the
government has generally been viewed as a single entity with a larger possible set of policy tools, a
perfect ability to commit, and endowed with a clear objective function (the maximization of social
welfare).'  This is not enough to assess the efficiency of the internal organization of a government.
This understanding requires, as suggested by Coase (1937) and developed by Williamson
(1975, 1985), the recognition that the organization of hierarchies is the result of a minimization of
transaction costs.2 These transaction costs have to be isolated in order to draw any policy-relevant
lessons from these theories.  The first transaction costs we will look at are dependent on the extent of
the informational problem faced by the government, and on the limitations in the scope governments
have in relying on the market to implement some of its regulatory responsibilities.  For instance, the
right of regulating an industry cannot be sold to outsiders.  Yet, while the state exerts regulatory rights,
some aspects of this responsibility can be subcontracted (auditing, detailed studies leading to rate or
price cap  revisions,  etc. ...).
In addition, a more policy-relevant theory of regulatory institutions has to deal with transaction
costs reflecting difficulties in writing fully contingent contracts.  Contracts often cover only a finite
amount of time, and are therefore not necessarily binding to future generations and future governments.
This often leads to a renegotiation of some administrative and incentive costs.  Moreover, a unified,
centralized government body ruling the economy in its entirety does not exist. Politics is, at its core,
competition between the several principals involved in public decision-making.  As noted by Moe
(1986) and Wilson (1989), bureaucrats are subject to a multitude of influences and  regulatory rights,
I Baron  and Myerson  (1982)  and Laffont  and Tirole (1993),
2 Importantly,  transaction  costs only  matter  because  government  intervention  takes  place under  asymmetric  information.  Under
symmetric  information,  the internal  organization  of the government  has no bites  on the outcome  of its intervention.  Coasian
bargaining  within  the government  makes  the internal  distribution  of regulatory  rights  within  the government  be irrelevant.
Transaction  costs  are therefore  dependent  on the extent of the informational  problem  faced  by the government  at the time of
intervening.  When  different  institutions  are associated  with different  values  of these  transaction  costs,  there  is scope  for their
comparison  and for a somewhat  rough  optimization  over regulatory  structures.3
and work on an issue is often shared among several agencies.  Last, there is no government
intervention, not even regulation, without an attempt by coalitions to manipulate its outcome.
Regulatory contracts and institutions have to account for the possibility of a capture of the bureaucracy
by interest groups.
Our thesis is this: When these transaction costs are taken into account, structures and processes
will affect regulatory outcomes and hence should be recognized explicitly in the design of incentives
based regulation.  First, the structures affecting the regulatory outcome include the distribution of
regulatory rights among different levels of the government, the objectives given to agencies, and the
voting procedures used to elect political principals, all of which influence regulatory decisions. 4 This is
not recognized by the normative approach to Public Economics.  Second, processes matter to regulatory
outcomes.  The timing of government intervention, the length and the span of control of different
regulatory bodies, and the design of the communication channels.within the regulatory hierarchy affect
the regulatory outcome. A failure to address these influences is bound to over- or under-estimate the
effective impact of incentive based-regulation on regulatory outcomes.
To explain more clearly how structure and processes matter to regulatory outcomes, the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the stages of our analysis.  It describes  the four-layer hierarchy
(voters-political principals-regulators-regulated  agents), which has been the fundamental source of
analysis of New Regulatory Economics so far.  At each of these layers, transaction costs can influence
the optimal design of the organization of the government.  The rest of the paper demonstrates how the
main types of transaction costs can influence this design.  Section 3 describes the government failures
that arise from contract incompleteness.  Section 4 proposes possible solutions to each of these failures,
beginning with the observation that structures and processes matter.  The point of this section is to show
how different forms of contract incompleteness may countervail each other.  Section 5 concludes by
developing some applications.
2. A  Stylized Multi-Layer View of the Regulatory Process in Restructured Infrastructure
Restructuring processes in infrastructure generally leave monopolistic providers in the
distribution of electricity, gas and water.  In the absence of any regulation of price, quantity and quality,
monopolists would restrict the firm's quantity and would charge an excessively high price to consumers.
Regulation is needed to reach a higher level of social welfare but it cannot be done directly by
consumers because of the well-known free-rider problem in collective actions. 5 It must therefore be
designed and enforced by institutional regulators who act in the name of voters and who can only handle
a  limited number of tasks because of standard bounded rationality problems. As an immediate
consequence, the control of the quality of service, of the price structure and the decision on the rate of
return on investment are left to a utility regulator.
3 Landis  (1960)  in his report  to the President  newly  elected  offers  a remarkable  survey  of these  overlapping  responsibilities.
See also  Kahn  (1988)  seminal  book on regulation.
4 In the UK for instance,  the electricity  regulator  was given  specific  ranking  of its responsibilities.  He/She  is responsible  to
secure  all reasonable  demand,  proper  financing  and promote  competition  and the defense  of the interest  of consumers  is subject
to these  three primary  responsibilities.  (see Electricity  Act 1989)
5 Even  if sometimes  governments  subsidize  consumer  associations  to create  a bilateral  monopoly.2
However,  this control is imperfect.  Regulators  face informational  asymmetries  in their
relationship  with the firm they regulate. They do not know  the exact technologies  of the firm and the
elasticity  of its demand. They have little knowledge  about  the internal  incentive  structure  of the firm
and the contracts  that it may  have with non-integrated  input  suppliers. Regulators  have limited  tasks to
perform,  but they often  have limited instruments  to carry  out their functions. For instance,  the
Environment  Protection  Agency (EPA)  in the US is only allowed  to ban  the use of some chemical
products,  but in principle  it could use more fine-tuned  incentives  to limit pollution  damages.
Control  imperfections  also stem from the fact that regulators  are not accountable  for their acts
directly  to consumers,  but instead  to "political"  principals.  Often, these political  principals  belong  either
to the legislative  or to the executive  branch  of the government. They  can be endowed  with a Federal  or
a State  mandate  and they can have  tenures  with quite different  lengths. They  have difficulties  in
controlling  regulators  who are generally  at an informational  advantage  because  of their expertise  or
simply  because  of their access  to historical  information. 6 In most countries,  the control  exercised  by the
Congress  on these regulators  is indirect.  There  is a system of Committees  and Subcommittees
representing  various constituencies,  which is subject  to various influences.  In some cases (as in the US),
part of the control  is not under the Congress  itself,  but instead under a government  budget  office which
exerts  budgetary  control  of these agencies.
Political  principals  themselves  can hardly  be put on explicit incentive  schemes  for maximizing
social  welfare  because  of the free-riding  problem  that voter-consumers  would  be facing in controlling
these  political entrepreneurs. 7 Instead,  consumers  use the rather rough and imperfect  procedures
inherent  in voting  to impose  some accountability  on the political principals. Only career considerations
and the threat of political  takeovers  can adjust  the political  decision-makers'  incentives.  It should be
noted  that the political  arena is not a perfectly  competitive  market. Enormous  fixed costs  must be
incurred  before  entering  this market. This reduces  the scope for an efficient  control  of the incumbents. 8
Moreover,  voters are often only imperfectly  informed  regarding  the effort and efficiency  of the political
decision-maker.  They  must therefore rely on rather imperfect  measures  of their own level of satisfaction
before deciding  on their voting strategy. 9
Each  of these layers  of the government  can be viewed  as a principal-agent  relationship  with its
own informational  problem. The simplified  overview  of society  that we get from the above  picture is
that society  and its government  are based on a sequence  of vertical  contracts  that solve,  more or less
easily,  a number  of agency  problems. Loss of control  results as incentives  trickle down  the hierarchy
through a system of delegation. However,  government  is not only vertical,  but, as discussed  in the
6 See  Kiewert  and  McCubbins  (1991)  for  a thorough  discussion  of the issues  raised  by the delegation
of some  powers  from  the  Congress  to the  bureaucracy.
7 There  is a clear  parallel  between  this  discussion  and  of  the  firm  as a monitoring  technology  due  to Alchian  and
Demsetz  (1972)  and  Holmstrom  (1982).
8 See  Myerson  (1997)  for  a discussion  of entry  in  the  political  market.
9 See  the  discussion  of sociotropic  voting  rules  of voting  in Ferejoh  (1986).3
introduction,  much of its peculiarities  come from its Multi-principal  nature.' 0 Regulators  share the
control  of the firmn.  Political  principals  share the control  of the regulatory  policies at a given  date, but
they also share this control  with their successors. Legislature  are themselves  divided  into numerous
Committees  and Subcommittees  with their own  objectives,  each of them trying  to influence  the
bureaucracy." Moreover,  the bureaucracy  is not a unified  body. Often agencies and bureaus  compete
with one another  for resources,  while at the same time bureaucrats  compete  for influence  within  a given
industry.
With this complex  description  of the regulatory  organization  in mind, we can  move to an
analysis  of the different  contractual  incompleteness'  which impede  the efficiency  of the government's
intervention.
3. Transaction  Costs in the Government  Organizational  Structure
The overall organization  of the government  can be seen as a nexus of more or less explicit
contracts  linking  stakeholders  together. The absence  of an overall grand and complete  regulatory
contract  creates opportunities  for hidden  gaming  which bring their own set of transaction  costs. The
contractual  externalities  that arise from the incompleteness  of regulatory  contracts  is a reality  that
departs  from the more idealized  view of society in which unified  control is feasible.  This section
reviews  the relevance  of the institutional  design of transaction  costs stemming  from various  types of
government  failure:  lack of government  commitment,  the Multi-principal  nature of government,  and the
excessive  discretion  of the various decision-makers  in the regulatory  process.
3.1 Lack of Commitment  and The Need for Renegotiation
Because  future contingencies  may not all be foreseen  at the time the government  proposes  a
regulatory  contract  to the firm,  and because  new information  becomes  available as the regulator  learns
about  earlier  realizations  of the contractual  targets, renegotiation  of the contract  matters and can
improve  ex post efficiency. This may, however,  lead to some counter-intuitive  results for practitioners.
To understand  why, it is useful to draw a comparison  between  situations  with and without  full
commitment.
Under  full commitment,  the optimal  regulation  of a public utility repeats  the way the optimal
static contract  deals with the fundamental  trade-offs  between  efficiency  and rent extraction. In order to
reduce  the costly informational  rent that can be obtained  by efficient  firms in mimicking  less efficient
ones through choosing  the same  menu  of cost targets and lump  sum transfers,  regulators  distort  the costs
and production  targets towards  less efficient  values  to make them less attractive  for an efficient  firm.
Without  full commitment,  after the first period of the relationship  the regulator  knows more
about  the private information  of the firm and is willing  to renegotiate  the regulatory  contract  to improve
second period  efficiency. This search  for increases  in ex  post efficiency  may nevertheless  introduce
10  See  Moe  (1986),  Baron  (1985)  and  Martimort  (1996b).
1  Moran  and Weingast  (1983)  show empirically  that the Congress  has much  of the bargaining  power  when  dealing  with  the
bureaucracy.4
some perverse  incentives  from an ex ante point  of view. Anticipating  an increase  in the power  of
incentives  later on, efficient  agents  behave suboptimally  in the earlier  periods of the relationship. They
tend, in particular,  not to reveal their information  and its revelation  is slowed  down in the hierarchy.' 2
This is where the counterintuitive  results show. For instance,  rates of return  may best be increased
following  a good performance.  Regulated  firms may best be allowed  to plan new investments  or to
change  their prices as new information  on demand  is learned. Otherwise,  a public utility  anticipating
that a regulator  will use the information  revealed  in the first period  of their relationship  to readjust  the
contractual  terms has fewer incentives  to reveal any information  that can help improve  the rent
efficiency trade-off ex post.
The main point is that incentive  compatibility  constraints  are hardened  by the mere possibility
of renegotiation.  As a results, first period  inefficient  choices  are made; underinvestment  in specific
assets, periods  of inefficient  technological  choices,  prices  far above  the marginal  cost in order  to
manipulate  the beliefs  of the regulator  on its marginal  cost before  the renegotiation  stage,  etc.... More
generally,  the inability  to commit  increases  the transaction  costs of contracting,  something  which is
often  underestimated  by practitioners. Moreover,  these  higher transaction  costs may be justified by the
need  to retain some flexibility  in order to ensure that past regulators  or political  principals  are not
allowed  to bind the future  of society  to a given  regulation. This is important  because  consumers  tastes
may change in the future,  or the political  principals  themselves  will may change  after an election  and
these new decision  makers  may favor other groups. Hence, society  as a whole agrees on imposing
limited  terms for the mandates of its political  principals  to limit  the possible  intertemporal  abuse of
powers.  13
3.2 The Multiprincipal  Nature  of Government
An important  step toward  assessing  the real nature  of the rent-efficiency  trade-off  discussed
above,  is to consider  government  intervention  as coming from a whole set of different  principals,  each
with its own objective.  14 As a whole, these principals  may have for a collective  objective  the
maximization  of the same  social welfare  function  as that of a single benevolent  regulator. However,
each single  principal  has only a limited  mandate  to fulfill. For instance,  the Environmental  Protection
Agency is concerned  with protecting  the environment,  which is only one aspect of the consumers'
welfare. At the same  time, the Utility Regulator  is concerned  with controlling  the rates  of return,  or the
price cap and prices structure  of the utility.  Each of these agencies  has only a partial  view of the
regulatory stake. 1 5
12The intertemporal  inconsistency  and its impact  on decision  rules  have been forcefully  made  in the macroliterature  which  has
analyzed  the issue  of rules versus  discretion.  See the seminal  contribution  of Kydland  and Presscott  (1977)  and the survey  of
the literature  presented  in Persson  and Tabellini  (1994,  Introductory  Chapter).  In an agency  context,  it has been  more  fully
understood  with the works  of Dewatripont  (1989)  and Laffont  and Tirole  (1990).
13 Constitutional  rules exist  which impose  such limits.  In France,  there is no limit in the number  of mandates  that a political
decision-maker  may  have in a row. The  only limitations  are on his span of control,  i.e., on the number  of mandates  he may
have  simultaneously.  In the US, a President  can only  have  two mandates  in a row.
14 This difference  is may be not so clear cut for the only reasons  that within  firms  the central  management  is also part  of a
bunch  of bilateral  explicit  contractual  relationships  with different  stakeholders  (creditors,  customers,  regulators,  owners,  etc...)
having  their own specific  interest  in the firm.
15  Baron (1985)  and Martimort  (1996b)  analyze  contractual  settings  describing  these  situations.  Their  basic  assumption  is that
the splitting  of responsibilities  among  the various  regulatory  agencies  comes  from a splitting  of their monitoring  technologies.
As a result  of this distribution  of regulatory  rights  each of these agencies  is only able  to contract  on its own sphere  of5
The importance  of this complex  structure  of government  can be illustrated  by three main  themes
in the literature  dealing  with multi-principals  agency  relationships:  allocative  inefficiency,  rent
distribution  and regulatory  rights, and the optimal  levels  of regulatory  decentralization  and the timing
and voting  right of the various agencies. These factors  are all influenced  by the design of regulatory
institutions.
Allocative  Inefficiency:  Under  this complex  structure,  the regulatory  process introduces  new
distortions  with respect  to what would have been implemented  under unity of command. The rent-
efficiency  trade-off,  which results from the regulators'  interactions,  must capture  the fact that a regulator
typically  does not take into account  what the other  regulators'  schemes  are when he offers  his own
regulatory  incentive  scheme.  Allocative  efficiency  is affected  by the separation  of powers  between  those
regulators.
Rent Distribution  and Regulatory  Rights:  The non-cooperative  behavior  of rival regulators  also
results in the firm being offered  excessively  low or excessively  high powered  incentives,  depending  on
the set of activities  that they respectively  control. When  several  regulators  control  complementary
activities  of the firm,  they extract  too much informational  rent from it and the power of incentives  tends
to become  excessively  low.  16 Each single  regulator exerts  a negative  externality  on the other. Cost-
plus arrangements  result from this overregulation." 7 When  regulators  instead control  substitute
activities,  the reverse  phenomenon happens as a result of regulatory  competition. Each regulator
competes  with the other for attracting  the agent  toward the activity  under his own control. The common
agent  can play one principal  against the other to escape their global  control. In equilibrium,  because
now  a principal  exerts a positive externality  on the others, higher  powered incentives  than what would
have  been collectively  optimal  end up being offered. Decisions  rules are then closer  to their full
information  values  and allocative  efficiency  improves.' 8 As a result,  the amount  of informational  rent
that is kept by the firm is larger  than what would  be socially optimal.' 9
responsibilities.  Their  non-cooperative  behavior  in regulating  the industry  follows.  The  regulation  implemented  is then a Nash
equilibrium  among  various  regulations  offered  in a decentralized  way.
16 Stole (1991) and Martimort (1992) and (1996a) and (1996b) present a general theory which analyzes the contractual
externalities that appear under adverse selection when regulatory powers are shared between non-cooperating agencies.
17 See also Bernheim and Whinston (1986) for an analysis of a common agency game under moral hazard case which also
exhibits this under-provision of effort.  Dixit (1996) discusses also a moral hazard model with linear schemes featuring also
lots of the insights of the present model. He applies it to the organization of the bureaucracy. We discuss this model in Section
3.3.2.
18 This is true when a pure equilibrium of the contracting game between the principals exists, Martimort and Stole (1997)
show that it may be possible to find information structures such that only mixed-equilibria exist with substitutes. In this case,
only distributions of regulatory rules are offered in equilibrium by each principal. This suggests that the policy outcome may
be quite fuzzy.
19 This discussion in terms of positive versus negative externalities between different government centers may offer an
unifying framework to read the emerging literature on  federalism and budget constraint (see Qian and Roland (1994)). This
literature argues that the allocation of fiscal and monetary policies to the regional and  the national levels is due to the nature of
the externalities (respectively positive and negative) that decentralizing these policies imply on the budget constraint of local
firms.6
Levels of Decentralization:  The number  of agencies in control  of the firm and the timing of their
interventions  change  the outcome of this structural  separation.  Administrative  processes  and structures
affect the outcome  of the regulatory  intervention.  The larger  the number  of agencies  controlling  a given
firm - allowing  permits, subsidizing or monitoring  it - the greater the inefficiency  of the regulatory
outcome. Indeed,  an extreme  version of the free-rider  problem  may  arise when control  is highly
decentralized.  It may not be worth allowing  a given project  to be done if one expects  other  agencies  to
restrict  their own contribution  to its financing. There is at least casual evidence  in the US that such
outcomes  arise. 20 The experience  of the EEC provides  other examples  in which local decisions  are
financed  by the supranational  institutions  in an environment  in which goals and incentives  are often  not
compatible.
Timing  and Voting  Right: The sequentiality  of the intervention  of different  agencies  calls also
for excessive  rent extraction  and allocative  distortions  that are now even larger  than in the simultaneous
game.21  For instance,  the Stackelberg  leader  position  of the EPA in designing  environmental  taxes vis-
a-vis local States  agencies worsens  the case for the separation  of the regulatory  responsibilities  on
environmental  issues between  the State and the Federal  levels of the government. Regulation  becomes
extremely  stringent.  An interesting  interpretation  of these sequential  timings is that the Stackelberg
leader  benefits  somewhat  from a veto right and only accepts regulations  that guarantee  his constituency
a minimal  utility.  As long as the regulators  have  quasi-linear  utility  functions  independent  of the
regulated  firms' private information,  the identity  of the vetoing  principal  has no effect on the regulatory
distortions. But when this assumption  is rejected,  the decentralization  of regulatory  responsibilities  can
lead to an optimal  assignment  of regulatory  instruments  that is also hierarchical. 22
In an open rule system,  Congress  is free to amend  any proposals  made by a committee. This
means  that the regulators  face multiple  principals. In this type of setting,  regulatory  agencies  are able  to
exploit  one of these principals  against  the other and increase  their own powers  regarding  the decision
being implemented.  To shift the policy  closer  to its most preferred  outcome,  which turns out to be that
of the median-voter,  the veto of the presidency  is needed  as an institutional  option.  23
3.3 Discretion of the Decision-Makers
In the regulatory  hierarchy,  discretion  matters at two different levels:  First, at the level of the
political  principal;  and second at the level of the regulatory  agency itself.  We sometimes  distinguish
between  formal  and real authority. As discussed  in Aghion  and Tirole (1997),  real authority lies in the
hands of agents  implementing  the final regulatory  decision,  i.e., in our case  the regulators  and
20 For instance,  in the US, transports  has been said  to be under  an extremely  inefficient  regulation  (Kahn  (1988)). Noticeably,
it is under several  overlapping  jurisdictions  concerning  the ICC,  the CAB,  the Federal  Marine  Commissions,  the FPC, the
Bureau  of Public  Roads,  the Department  of Commerce,  etc See also,  Landis  (1961)  for a discussion  of the externalities
associated  to these  separation  of powers  among  agencies  and its consequences  on regulatory  efficiency:  Delays  in decision-
making,  overloads  due to inter-regulatory  agency  conflicts  to be settled,  etc.
21 See Martimort  (I  996b) for a formal  proof of this assertion.
22 See Estache  and Zheng  (1995)  for a model  discussing  the optimal  instrument  assignment  in the context  of multiple  lawyers
of regulators  playing  Stackeberg  game.
23 This  veto can be easily  modeled  in an agency  framework  as a constraint  on the well-being  of the president.7
bureaucrats.  Instead,  political decision  makers  are endowed  with the formal  authority  to make public
decisions. Both are important  and need to be recognized  to understand  how the overall  design of
regulatory  institutions  influences  regulatory  outcomes.
3.3.1 Discretion of the Political Principal
The Received Theory: Frictionless Influence. A line of research commonly associated with the
Chicago  School  of economics  is often quoted  by practitioners  to argue  the importance  of political  risks
and discretion  in the design of regulatory  institutions.  This research  illustrates  very clearly  the idea  that
political  principals  who have some discretion  regarding  the set of policies  that can be implemented,  are
subject  to a number  of conflicting  influences  exerted  by different  pressure groups,  i.e. consumers,  firms,
taxpayers  etc...  24 This line of research  has put forward  the idea that the political principal  puts some
values  on the contributions  or the amount of bribes  that he receives  from the interest  groups,  but also
considers  social  welfare. Contributions  are valuable  for the political decision-maker,  first because  they
help him finance  his electoral  campaigns  and second  because  these bribes may be only pure perks.
Social  welfare  matters because  political  decision-makers  have reelection  concerns  and it gives an
aggregate  measure  of the satisfaction  of society.
The first prediction  of these papers are that the interest groups  are powerful,  i.e.,  they affect the
economic  outcome  when they are able to circumvent  the celebrated  free-riding  problem  in collective
actions. These  papers are, however,  unable  to assess the true reasons  why free-riding  is less an issue for
some group  forming  than for others. The true parameters  underlying  the influence  of an interest  group
are not characterized.  As a result,  the outcome  of the game is almost immediate:  Lobbies  influence  the
policy outcome  by moving  the choice of policy  toward  their own preferred  outcomes. The  political
decision-maker maximizes a welfare function which favors interest groups.25  Importantly, even if he
does not provide  a formal  treatment  of this issue,  Posner  (1976)  nevertheless  also stresses  the view that
the force of an interest group  may depend  on the institutional  setting. Structures  matter in defining  the
power  of a group.  The main problem  is that it is also difficult  to see how the contract  between  an
interest  group and the political  decision-maker  is more enforceable  than any other contract  aimed at
controlling  this political  decision  maker in the first place. Because  it ignores the agency  problem  that
makes  the control  of these political principals  impossible,  this line of research is unable  to give  a clear
account  of the role of the regulatory  institutions  in constraining  their behavior,  as well as that of the
different  pressure  groups.  Hence, it has little to offer in terms of specific policy  advice.
Political Principals and the Distribution of Rents.  An interesting alternative approach is
proposed  by Baron (1989)  and Laffont  (1995). They do not restrict a priori the set of instruments
available  to the political  decision-makers.  However,  they make explicit the assumption  that the choice
of the political principal  is made through a voting  procedure. Society  is composed  by voters with
different  preferences  on the level of regulation  that should  be implemented.  In fact, these  preferences
may directly  come  from ideology  or from the different shares  of the regulated  firm that each group  of
voters individually  gets. As a result of the voting  procedure,  the regulatory  choice of the median voter
is implemented.  The case  to reduce  discretion  is due to the fact that this political  principal  does  not
24 Grossman  and Helpman  (1994).
25 See Helpman  (1997)  for a survey  of this literature.8
maximize  social  welfare  defined  as an aggregate  of the voters'  utilities,  but instead  the welfare  of the
median-voter,  his constituency,  and not society  as a whole.
An important  corollary  of this line of research  is that suboptimal  contracts like average  cost
pricing or simple  quotas can now find a rationale. Even if these tools are imperfect  ways of transferring
wealth  between  groups,  they can also be used to tie the hands  of the political  principal  by reducing  his
discretion.  But a full endorsement  of these instruments  would require  a better understanding  of the way
in which different  constituencies  can try to align the preferences  of the political decision-maker  with
their own. In other words,  what is lacking  is a complete  full-fledged  treatment  of how campaign
contributions  and other forms of influence  by interest groups  affect  the outcome of the political  game,
and therefore  the incentives  of a political  candidate  to align his policy  with that of an interest  group.
Indeed,  these  political principals  are putting some  value on reelection  which may depend  on the number
of voters who choose  them and the preferences  of the latter  are likely to be affected  by the stringency  of
the regulation. 26 Another  unsolved  issue is the exact role played by institutions  on the final economic
outcome. The voting  procedure  used to select the political  principal is somewhat  exogenous. Yet it
would seem important  to know  how different districts  which are affected  differently  by regulation
aggregate  their preferences  through the voting procedure.
3.3.2.  Discretion  of the Regulators
An interest group  can be active  not only before  the enactment  of a regulatory  policy,  as
discussed  above,  but also at its implementation  stage. In other  words, interference  with the regulatory
process  can also arise  within the regulatory  institution  and this is something  practitioners  tend  to be very
much concerned  with. This concern  is the main anchor  to the debate on accountability,  independence
and autonomy.  The problems  can arise from three main sources:  internal  vs. external  influences  on the
regulators;  conflicts between  the legislative  powers  and the bureaucracy;  and the complex  dynamics  of
bureaucratic  behavior.
Internal  and external influences:  Bureaucracies  are the nexus of conflicting  influences.
Regulatory  agencies  are no different  and are subject  to several  influences,  in particular,  the internal
influence  of a political  principal  representing  the voters'  interests,  and the external  influence  of interest
groups. As a result  of this multiplicity  of efforts in curbing  his behavior, the "regulators-bureaucrats"
end up being vested  in the status quo and it becomes  extremely  hard to provide  any incentives. 27 There
are two ways  to influence  the bureaucrats'  incentives:  first, wages; second  implicit incentives,  i.e., career
concerns. In addition,  exogenous  restrictions  on the set of instruments  available  to the different  political
principals  controlling  the bureaucracy  may help to reduce  the scope of the bureaucrats  in regard  to rent-
extraction.28  When  different principals,  for instance  different  Committees,  are affected  by the activities
of the bureaucrat-regulator,  which are substitutes,  the latter can play one principal  against  the other to
get more freedom.  The bureaucracy  goes its own way. The solution  is to increase  accountability  by
26 Laffont and Boyer (1995) build such a model. They assume that a political decision-maker is reelected with a
probability which is proportional  to the amount of campaign contributions he receives. This amount is in turn  linked to the
informational rent that the interest group gets from regulation. Grossman and Helpman (1996) try to endogenize the weight
that a political decision makers put on an interest group as coming from a campaign contributions game.
27 Spiller (1991) and also Wilson (1989)
28 Dixit (1996)9
exposing  the bureaucrat  and making available  private infornation on the effectiveness  of the
bureaucrat's  behavior.  Simple institutional  rules like the public  release of regulatory  information  may
allow  this kind of information  sharing between  multiple  principals.  In a nutshell,  regulatory  processes
can matter  in curbing  the bureaucracy  and practitioners  are right  to emphasize  this point.
The Conflict  between  the Legislative  Power and the Bureaucracy: An agency  problem  between
the political  principal,  the Congress  and the regulatory  agencies  can also create  the conditions  necessary
for the capture  of these regulators  by an interest  group. 29 The agency is used by Congress  as a
monitoring  system observing  signals regarding  the private information  of the public  utility. This
discretion  in the hand of the regulator  gives him some power  or, put differently,  some real authority.  30
Indeed,  by bribing  its regulator,  the firm can insure  a misuse  of his power. The  regulator  will prefer
taking  perks or a position  in the industry  later on rather than obey the regulatory  mandate  he has
received. Again, this is why it makes so much sense  to restrict future interactions  between  a regulatory
and the firms it is regulating.
This means  that on top of the usual incentive  constraints,  a regulatory  contract  must also satisfy
a set of collusion-proof  constraints  to insure that the regulator  does not misuse  his power. This does
not come cheap  to society. 31  The  existence  of communication  costs in the fornation of the capturing
coalition  or the presence  of some transaction  costs due to the non-enforceability  of the side-contracts
will generally  prevent  the regulator  from getting  the full informational  rent of the firm. Capture  can
only be effective  when a stake exists in concealing  from the political  principal  information  which is
favorable  to the regulated  agent. This happens  quite often in the context of utility privatization  for
instance.
The problem  is that the constraints  needed  to avoid  collusion/corruption  affect  the terms of the
trade-off  between  efficiency  and rent-extraction. To limit  the regulator's  incentives  to collude  with an
efficient  firm which earns some informational  rent from regulation,  the political principal  has to reduce
further  the regulatory  stake. This in turn increases  the distortions  in the production  decisions  when
compared  to the problem  free environment. Moreover,  these distortions  have to be greater when
collusion  is relatively  more  efficient, i.e.,  when the transaction  costs of side-contracting  are low. Low-
powered  regulation  is then called for to limit  the scope for collusion. They indeed imply  lower levels  of
rent for efficient  types and therefore  less possibilities  for corrupting  regulators. These  low-powered
incentives  also correspond  to the choice  of more bureaucratic  rules for the agency. The latter is given
less power  and less discretion. The point  of this all is that processes  also matter and can be quite costly
to an efficient  outcome.
The Dynamics  of Bureaucratic  Behavior: Part of the reality of regulation  is that there are side-
contracts  between  a regulator  and the interest group  he regulates. Since  they are not legal, they cannot
29 Laffont  and Tirole  (1993,  Chapter  13).  Kiewert  and McCubbins  (1991)  make  the important  point  that the delegation  process
from Congress  to the bureaucracy  leads  surely  to the abdication  of any power.
30 As Niskanen  (1971)  has forcefully  argued,  information  is the key which  allows  the bureaucracy  to pursue  other  objectives
than social  welfare  maximization.
31 The  regulatory  agency  is assumed  to have  all the bargaining  power  when  offering  the side-contract  to the interest  group.  In
other words,  there is little  competition  within  the bureaucracy  for  the exercise  of power.10
be enforced by a court ofjustice.32 The regulator is lenient with the firm as long as his prospects for
getting "bribes" or future employment opportunities in the industry are high.  The firm is ready to
"bribe" the regulator as long as he remains lenient in his stances.  Modeling capture or influence of the
interest group as an enforceable side-contract hides some features of the dynamics of capture.
Martimort (I 997b) shows that side-contract agreements become easier to enforce when the regulator is
better informed about the firm or when the preferences for the future of the administrative branch of the
government are more pronounced than the preferences for the future of the political principal himself.
The discrepancy between the long-term objectives of the bureaucracy and that of the political principals
matter and affect the regulatory outcome.  In sum, transaction costs of side-contracting are endogenous
and depend on mere regulatory institutions.  Again, the point is that structures matter to regulatory
outcomes.
4. The Whole Picture: Transaction Costs at Play
In this section, we take a  broader perspective on regulatory institutions to try to see how a more
coherent design of regulatory institutions can be used to reduce the influence of the government failures
discussed in section 3 on regulatory outcomes. Following an argument already applied with some
success by Williamson (1985) regarding the theory of the firm, we argue that the optimal regulatory
institutions are those which minimize the overall transaction costs of contracting.  To test the
implications of this paradigm for the internal organization of the government, we use the results
highlighted in the last section to better understand how through playing contractual externalities against
one another, the other may help improve social welfare.  This second-best approach is obviously subject
to the same weaknesses as any other second-best analysis.  We nevertheless think that this second-best
approach turns out to be extremely useful for getting a richer picture of the internal organization of the
government.
4.1. How to Improve Commitment?
The first step in the search for a regulatory institution that minimizes transaction costs, and hence
interference with desirable regulatory outcomes, is to look for an approach that guarantees a
commitment by all parties involved to deliver on their responsibility.  Since contracts between the firmns,
the regulators, the executive and the legislative powers are likely to be quite incomplete, the
specification of renegotiation rules is quite critical and so are the systems of checks and balances as
discussed below.
4.1.1 Renegotiation  Rules and Separation of Powers
A well-known result among political scientists, and part of the recent folklore of the industrial
organization economists, is that the design of rules and processes at the renegotiation stage can improve
commitment. 33 One particular choice is the separation of powers between different regulatory agencies.
This is not something that practitioners like to recommend.  Indeed, the idea of unifying regulatory
32 A noticeable  exception  is given by political  campaign  contributions.
33 This  point  has for instance  been forcefully  made  by McCubbins,  Noll and Weingast  (1986)  and (1989).  See also Spiller
(1991)  and Spiller  and Levy  (1995)I1
responsibilities  under a single umbrella  institution  is quite a common  recommendation.  Theoretical
research  suggests  that this may not be the best strategy  when commitment  capacity  by the government
to the regulatory  contract  is limited or when renegotiation  is a likely outcome  of the reform  process.
No Commitment  at All: Under an extreme  form of incompleteness,  in which regulatory  contracts
are limited  to cover  only the current  period  because  of some type of constitutional  constraint  for
instance,  Olsen  and Torsvick  (1993)  show that it may be better to split up the control  of the  firm
between  two regulatory  agencies  rather than leaving  all the control rights in the hand of a single
omnipotent  regulator. 34 Under separation,  both regulators  control  the firm's output. As a result of this
complementarity  between  their regulatory  tools, their free-riding  in providing  incentives  to the firm
implies  that there is an excessive  extraction  of the firm's  rent in the second period  of the relationship.
The firm receives  excessively  low-powered  incentives  under separation. The main benefit is that this
makes it less valuable  for an efficient  firm to hide its type in the first period  of the relationship. As a
result,  there is more information  revelation  in earlier  periods and total intertemporal  welfare  may
increase. It should  be clear however,  that second  period  benefit should  be traded off against  the cost of
the first period  competition  between  the different  agencies. In sum,  the overall  benefits of separation
are finally unclear  when one assesses  its impact  from an intertemporal  point  of view. The  more general
result is that there may exist an optimal  degree of decentralization  in the regulatory  charter, i.e., an
optimal  number  of agencies  in control  of a given firm. This number  optimally  trades off the cost of a
larger  static inefficiency  coming from  the coarser  sharing of regulatory  rights against  its dynamic
benefits. 3
Renegotiation:  Renegotiation  improves  ex post efficiency,  however,  the free-rider  problem
among  regulatory  agencies  at the time of renegotiating  the contract  makes  this ex  post improvement
harder  to achieve. 36 Separation  improves  the commitment  ability of the government,  but there is a twist.
Intertemporal  welfare increases  with separation  only when  the latter takes place at the renegotiation
stage.  The optimal  regulatory  charter requires,  therefore,  a cooperative  offer of the regulatory  contracts
when regulation  of a firm starts. It also requires  the splitting  up of the regulatory  rights among  various
agencies  at the renegotiation  stage. Generally,  this type of optimal  regulatory  charter is unfeasible. 37
The more  important  result  that practitioners  may want to keep in mind  is that the excessive  splitting  of
the responsibilities  of regulatory  agencies  may be good for regulatory  outcomes.
The solution  may be to go for sequential  moves of the regulatory  decisions. For instance,  the
federal  government  may act as a leader in renegotiating  regulatory  contracts. Then  local governments
follow by offering  complementary  regulations. This type of institutional  framework  corresponds  to
what is used in the Common  Agricultural  Policy in the European  Community. In sum, the case for
separation  as a way to improve  commitment  through  the precise fine tuning  of the regulatory  process  is
an ambiguous  one. Nevertheless,  we believe  that it has strong  relevance.
34 More  exactly,  their model  deals  with the issue  of privatization  and the consequences  of the structural  separation  between
the owners  of the firm and its  regulator.
35 Olsen  and Torsvick  (1995)
36 Martimort  (1997)  shows  why and how  the separation  of powers  acts as a commitment  at the renegotiation  stage  to have a
tough  renegotiation  among  the different  non-cooperating  agencies  controlling  the regulatory  agenda.
37 See Kahn  (1988)  for a discussion  of the expansion  of regulation  over  time.12
4.1.2.  Checks and Balances
The recommendation  in favor of separation  also comes  up in the discussion  on checks  and
balances. Sometimes  the lack of commitment  comes  from the inability  to contract  ex ante  on a variable
which provides  a valuable  signal on the firm's  performance,  one that becomes  only available  at the
interim  stage. For instance,  the future  profitability  of a firm or the quality of its products  cannot  be
assessed  at the time of the writing  of the contract.
Tirole (1994) shows  that creating  different agencies  with each having  a specific  objective
function  improves  commitment. Indeed,  these agencies  intervene  differently  depending  on the
realizations  of this signal. For instance,  an agency  concerned with consumer's  surplus  intervenes
following  evidence  that the firm will charge  a high price in the future. A Ministry  of Finance,
concerned  with the profitability  of the firm will terminate  projects  that turns out to have intermediate
cost overruns. Allocating  the right to intervene  between  "tough" and "soft" agencies  according  to the
ex  post realization  of the signals  readjusts  the ex ante incentives  of the firm and improves  intertemporal
welfare. In a similar  vein, Lewis and Sappington  (1991) analyze  the intertemporal  separation  of powers
between  two short lived  principals. They  take the allocation  of tasks between  both regulators  as given
but show that this separation,  i.e., the impossibility  of regulators  transferring  money  from one period  to
the other  because  they are under  the control of different  regulators,  may be helpful in protecting  the
non-verifiable  investment  of the regulated  firm.
In both of these papers, a system  of Checks and Balances  is constructed  in which different
agencies  react differently  to the information  they may receive. The design of the objective  function  of
the regulators  then becomes  an important  tool to control  both the regulated  firm  and readjust  the
incentives  of the regulator  to intervene. The discussion  of the specific  objectives  is, however,
something  practitioners  seldom  deal with explicitly.
4.1.3. Elected Political Principals and Independent Agencies
The above  discussion  focused only on the case  of a benevolent  principal  unable  to commit
himself  to an intertemporal  behavior. The splitting  of the social  welfare function  among  several
agencies  was helpful  but things become different  in the case of a political principal. Elected  political
principals  cannot  commit  the future  of society  to a particular  regulation. However,  because  they have a
majority,  they often  have the possibility  of creating  independent  agencies  and relinquishing  some of
their powers  and responsibilities  to them. Of course,  the threat of losing future  elections  makes  them
create  independent  agencies  that will still represent  their constituencies  even in case of political  defeat.
Examples  abound  in regulation,  but perhaps the most striking  one belongs  to the macroeconomics  arena.
The choice  of relinquishing  the control of monetary  policy to an independent  central  bank is a way for a
government  in favor of a monetarist  policy  to commit  future  generations  to it, even if future
governments  might  be more willing  to allow  higher levels of inflation.
We are not aware of any formal theoretical  analysis  along  these lines in the framework  of the
New Regulatory  Economics. We nevertheless  conjecture  that relinquishing  regulatory  rights  to
independent  agencies  may have social  benefits,  at least from an ex  post point of view. More groups  are
represented  in the regulatory  decisions  that are taken expost and future  minorities  are somewhat
protected. The ex post regulatory  outcome  is closer  than that which would  have been chosen  by a
benevolent  regulator. However,  at the time of enacting  a regulatory  agency with similar  objective13
functions  as its own, a non-benevolent  government  creates his own  competition. As we have shown
earlier, this competition  entails inefficiency. Competition  between  government  bodies extracts  too
much  rent from the constituency  it is supposed  to protect. Relinquishing  regulatory  powers  has also ex
ante costs.
4.1.4 Credibility  of Commitment  to a Regulatory  Charter
An important  problem  of the models  we have  just surveyed  is that they assume that the commitment  to
creating  an agency  and incurring  the administrative  costs  that it requires,  is interpreted  by the regulatory
players  as a credible  signal  that the newly defined  objectives  and responsibilities  of this agency  are not
going to be overruled  in the future. Institutional  designs  have to be credible  to have any bite.
The credibility  of the separation  between  various agencies  can be enforced  by standard
reputation-like  arguments. As argued  by the reputation  literature,  because  they are long-term  players,
agencies  should be able to impose  their most preferred  regulatory  outcome, i.e., should  be able to render
their structural  separation  credible. This argument  is a little loose and suffers  from two underpinnings:
First, if reputations  could be build  by agencies  to improve  their collective  commitment  abilities,  a single
agency could  certainly  also build  a reputation  for not renegotiating  any regulatory  contracts  in the first
place; second,  agencies themselves  may be long-term  players  but bureaucrats  often have limited
tenures.  One should  understand  how collective  reputations  could establish  among cohorts  of regulators,
especially  when they sometimes  have different  intrinsic  preferences  on the stringency  of regulation.
4.2. How to Limit the Scope  for Non-Benevolence?
Since  non-benevolence  is to be expected,  it seems  reasonable  to look for ways to limit its scope.
One way  of doing so is by focusing  on the simplicity  of the instruments  of regulation. We already
discussed this possible  remedy to the non-benevolence  of political principals. Regulatory  contracts
could  be simplified  to leave less leeway  to the political decision-makers.  This suggests  that simple  rules
like the constraints  on the use of discretionary  transfers  and the short-term  mandates  of political
principals  can be written as constitutional  rules aimed at controlling  these non-benevolent  principals.
More generally,  the use of instruments  which are not sensitive  to information,  like for instance  quotas, is
a way to curb the non-benevolence  of political  decision-makers,  even if it creates  other problems  when
contract  enforcements  are a problem,  as is typical  in many  reforming  countries  and in environments  in
which information  is limited.
Another  way of dealing with non-benevolence,  which is important  in countries  with an
inefficient  public sector in need  of reform,  is to figure  out what is the optimal  speed of reform.
Dewatripont  and Roland (1991)  show that a benevolent  principal  willing  to impose  some layoffs  on an
industry  is likely  to prefer  to gradually  impose  these layoffs  rather  than impose  them right  away when
its policy has to be accepted  by a majority  of voters/workers  within the sector. Under unanimity,  it is a
well known  result  from the incentive  literature  that the optimal  policy should  be implemented  with full
commitment.  38 Under majority  rule, the political principal  prefers to impose  its reform  gradually,  i.e.,
workers  leave  an industry  at different  dates depending  on their efficiency. By doing so, the principal
38 See  Baron  and Besanko  (1992).14
learns  some information  on the workers'  efficiency  and can use it to credibly  threaten  to shift majorities
in the future. He can impose some  concessions  from some groups  in the majority  today  by threatening
them with being in the minority  tomorrow. Allowing  the political  principal  to use such credible  threats
increases  his bargaining  power.  Reform  processes  are important  when the political game  imposes  only
majority  voting.
4.3  Separation  of regulatory  powers  as a way to prevent  capture
Under integration  of the regulatory  powers,  collusion  is quite efficient  and society  must incur  a
large cost of capture. For instance,  bad projects  are too often allowed  and the budgetary  burden on
society  increases. Instead,  asymmetric  information  between  partially  informed  regulators  and the firm
they regulate  weakens  their ability  to extract  advantages  from the firm. Asymmetric  information
implicitly  increases  the transaction  costs of capture. The overall cost of capture  borne by society  is
diminished  by the introduction  of competition  between  asymmetrically  informed  bureaucrats.
The structural  separation  between  different  regulatory  agencies  can act as a commitment  to
prevent  regulatory  capture  by some interest  groups. For instance,  splitting  the control  rights on the
firm's output  between  a Public  Utility Commission  and an Environmental  Protection  Agency  helps
prevent  the capture  of the regulatory  process  by the producer. Several  regulatory agencies  with specific
missions  are now  each controlling  only one dimension  of the overall performance  of the firm. Their
incomplete  knowledge  about  the dimensions  that they do not directly  observe  puts them at a
disadvantage  vis-a-vis  a the firm in the collusion  game. Their  individual  ability  to extract  rents from the
firm is then weakened. Instead,  if the regulators  have been merged,  they would  be able to fully observe
the performance  of the firm. Their demands  for bribes could  perfectly  match the supply,  i.e.,  the
informational  rent which is left to the firm if the regulator  behaves  in a lenient  way.
The argument  for separation  has to be considered  much more  carefully  than what this quick
assessment  suggests.  The various interactions  between  separation  and regulatory  outcomes  are
discussed  next in some detail.
4.3.1 The efficiency  and the distributional  consequence  of separation
The efficiency  and distributional  consequences  of the structural  separation  are somewhat
ambiguous. On the one hand, the separation  of powers  can be a way for the interest  group  to escape  the
control of its incompetent  or corrupted  regulators. This is the standard  argument  given  by practitioners
on why a public  utility  commission,  for instance,  is better than sector specific  regulators. 39 Efficient
firms can get rents from every dimension  of information  observed  by the regulators. Henceforth,  they
can better fool them when regulators  do not cooperate. On the other hand, the discretion  of partially
informed  regulators  who may be corrupted  may  justify a reduction  in their individual  power  which can
be obtained  through separation. Because  of the asymmetric  information  they face, regulators  exert  their
individual  power  in trying to capture  benefits  from the industry  only when the latter is inefficient.
Hence,  to diminish  the discretion  of these regulators,  only the informational  rent of these less efficient
firms needs to be reduced. Therefore,  less efficient  firms unambiguously  lose from the structural
separation  of powers  and this is how regulatory  outcomes  improve  under the separation  of regulatory
39 Laffont and Martimort (1995) show how efficient firms may be able to play advantageously one regulator  against the other.15
powers. Inefficient  firms suffer  from the more bureaucratic  rules followed  by each single  agency  to
reduce  the cost of collusion-proof.  Separation  advocates  for the use of more  bureaucratic  rules. The
choice of communication  channels  and the choice of more bureaucratic  rules are two complementary
tools used to improve  the design  of the internal  organization  of the government. Again, structures  and
processes  move  hand in hand.
4.3.2. Separation and the firm's  budget constraints
Separation  has not only ambiguous  distributional  consequences,  but it also has an ambiguous
allocative  impact. Indeed,  separation  may both harden  and soften the firm's budget  constraint
depending  on the extent of the adverse  selection  problem  that the government  faces. Separation  may
indeed  call for less or more projects  being accepted  by the regulatory  charter when several agencies  are
used to help the decision  making process. For small  (resp. large) uncertainties,  less (resp. more)
projects  are still allowed  under separation. In this case, rules are not too bureaucratic  under  integration
because  even if the single  regulator  gets captured,  the stake of collusion  and the cost for society  remain
small. The single  regulator  under integration  keeps enough  discretion  to allow  the pursuit of some bad
projects. As we discussed  above,  rules are more bureaucratic  under separation  and bad projects  are
more likely  to be stopped  by a charter with several  regulatory  agencies.
This result is in sharp contrast  with the one obtained  by Dewatripont  and Maskin (1995).  These
authors  show that some form of decentralization  of the rights of refinancing  projects  hardens  the firm's
budget  constraint. 40 Similarly,  Schleifer  and Vishny  (1993)  discuss  how corrupted  regulators  holding
complementary  permits  are able to extract an excessive  amount  of bribes from the firm leading  to
insufficient  entry on the market, i.e., hardening  its budget  constraint. 4' In sum,  the theoretical  jury is still
out on the impact  of separation  on specific  regulatory  outcomes. Practitioners  have generally  already
decided  against it in developing  countries  with limited  institutional  capacity.
4.3.3. Separation  and communication  problems
Until now,  we have assumed  that communications  between each regulator  and the principal
were taking place simultaneously.  The benefits  of separation  also exist when we allow one regulator  to
observe  other regulators' information  before deciding  on the degree  of collusion  with the firms
regulated. This hierarchical  organization  captures  the often observed  asymmetry  in the role of different
40 The  main  focus  of Dewatripont  and Maskin  (1995)  is the organization  of the banking  sector.  They  show  that a banking
sector  in which lenders  are constrained  in the size  of the loans  they offer can be used as an effective  incentive  device.  When
lenders  have  a  limited  ability  to finance  projects,  a venture  needs  to look  for refinancing  by other  lenders  who are at an
informational  disadvantage  vis-a-vis  initial lender.  As a result,  the cost  of capital increases  and this hardens  the ex ante
incentives  of the firm to complete  projects  earlier. Obviously,  the logic of their argument  also applies  to regulatory  agencies
with limited  budgets.
41 Their  approach  is cast  in terms  of exogenous  stakes  of collusion  and exogenous  bribery strategies.  We  already  address  in
Section  3.2  this excessive  rent-extraction  which arises  in a multiprincipal  models  when  the latter  control only  complementarity
activities  of the agent. The  weakness  of this approach  is that it overestimates  the problem  of control of the bureaucracy  by
modeling  no control at all. Because,  it has no normative  underpinnings,  there is no place for a welfare  comparison  between
regulatory  institutions.
Multiplying  the number  of regulators  to induce  inefficiencies  in the bribery  game  is also an argument  that  the Public  Choice
literature has put forward (Miller, Shughart and Tollison (1984)). This approach suffers nevertheless from the same
weaknesses as Schleifer and Vishny (1993).16
regulators  intervening  at different stages of the regulatory  process. For instance,  the procedures  for
merger  control  differ across countries  but in general  require  two stages  to be completed  sequentially;
notification  and investigation. According  to Nutall and Seabright  (1993),  who compare  the different
organizations  of regulations,  in some countries,  such as the United  Kingdom,  two distinct  bodies are in
charge  with each of these  tasks, respectively  the Director  General  for Fair Trading  and The Monopolies
and Merger Commissions. In the European  Economic  Commission,  a unique  body,  the Merger  Task
Force performs  both activities. Even if one could  agree with these authors and recognize  that a
concentration  of the tasks speeds  up the regulatory  process, it may also involve  greater  costs in terms of
capture. Laffont  and Martimort  (1995) show that a sequential  separation  between  regulators  still helps
in fighting  capture.  However,  the gains of reducing  the cost of collusion-proof  constraints  are only
obtained  vis-a-vis the first intervening  agency,  which is only partially informed  and therefore at a
disadvantage  in the bribery game  with the regulated  firm. The sequential  separation  between  the
regulators  comes  with  an asymmetry  between  their real authority  and the level of bureaucratic
procedures  they follow. Regulators  moving  first follow more  bureaucratic  procedures  and are entitled
to less formal  authority  than regulators  moving  last. Again, structure  and processes  matter  on the
regulatory  outcome.
4.3.4. The  Life Cycle of Regulatory  Agencies  and Transaction  Costs
Institutions  affect the efficiency  of the collusion  game between  the interest  groups  and the
regulatory  agencies.  The key to getting a richer  vision of the capture  transaction  is to see it as a self-
enforceable  side-contract  between  the regulator  and the firm it regulates. This is the natural  theoretical
framework  to analyze  this collusion,  but it is also the most realistic  way, the formalism  of regulatory
processes  and rules are often dominated  by less formal processes  and rules.  42 This is because  there is
no court  of justice to enforce  these illegal  agreements  and the party to the contract  must rely on "words
of honor"  to fulfill their agreements. The common  view argues that the repetition  of the regulatory
game is good  because it allows for less opportunistic  behaviors  by the regulator.  43  This is in fact not the
case in a repeated  game environment  in which the regulator  is always  the same.  The expectations  of the
regulator  on future advantages  deriving  from friendly  behavior  toward  the industry,  and the expectation
of the industry  on lenient  behavior  from the regulator  are the glue  that allows these illegal  agreements  to
be self-enforcing.44
These  informational  rents, which will be under the control of the regulator  in the future,  create
the stakes  for starting  collusive  relationships  immediately. The higher  the stakes in the future,  the
higher  the cost of capture  today. Since  more and more  opportunities  for collusive  behavior  may emerge
over time, the optimal  regulatory  charter calls for smaller  and smaller  regulatory  stakes as time goes on.
Therefore,  one should  also impose  more and more  bureaucratic  rules as agencies  grow  older.  In other
words,  the bureaucratization  of the government  intervention  is an unavoidable  outcome. 45 Agencies
follow a so-called  "Life Cycle". They  begin by behaving in the public interest  and then become  more
42 See Tirole  (1992)  and Martimort  (1997)  for  models  along  these  lines.
43 Salant  (1992),  Salant  and Woroch  (1993)  and Gilbert  and Newbery  (1993)
44 See Fudenberg  and Maskin  (1986)  for a general  proof  of the Folk Theorem  in repeated  games.
45 As suggested  by numerous  political  scientists:  Lierson  (1949),  Bernstein  (1955), Huntington  (1966)  and Downs  (1967)
among  others)  but also by sociologists  and finally  by practitioners  (Kahn  (1988)17
and more  under the influence  of interest groups.  They  then become  vested in the status quo and overly
bureaucratized.
This Life Cycle view of regulatory  agencies  modeling  as capture  also gives firmer theoretical
foundations  to the Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 13)  model of capture,  which instead  assumes
enforceable  side-contracts,  although  the long-run  outcome  of the regulation  is the same as that obtained
with a static model of capture. 46 The key novelty of the analysis  is to derive the efficiency  of the side-
contracts  from the institutional  structure. These  side-contracts,  because  they are not enforceable  and
rely on a dynamic  process  to establish,  suffer from some transaction  costs. These  transaction  costs of
capture  change  with simple institutional  constraints:  they decrease  with the amount  of information  that
the regulator  gets on the firm; they decrease  with the discount  factor of the principal,  i.e., with the
discrepancy  between  the time horizon  of the political principal  and that of the firm; and, they  decrease
also with the discount  factor of the bureaucracy.  Changing  these parameters  increases  the value of the
continuation  of capture for the regulator  and the firm. The capture transaction  is now easier  to be
enforced.
The consequences  of this endogenization  of the transaction  cost of capture for institution  design
are immediate.  First, arm's  length regulation,  in which  the political  principal  exerts  the regulatory rights
itself and where  there is little room for an active  bureaucracy,  could be preferred  to a more day-to-day
relationship  with the firm,  which occurs under regulation. The recent move  away from regulation  and
towards  antitrust  policies  observed in European  countries  can be provided  with a rationale  along  these
lines. Indeed,  antitrust  policies make little use of ex ante monitoring  devices  and correspond  in fact to
the use of ex  post monitoring  controls. Courts,  and often  poorly informed  judges, are given large
degrees  of discretion  in an absolutely  non-predictable  way in order to break any scope for capture  by the
industry.  The reinforcement  of antitrust  agencies  throughout  Latin America for instance  could be seen
as a significant  potential  improvement  of the potential  efficiency  of regulatory  outcomes  for the same
reason.
The Life-Cycle  view of regulatory  agencies  also shows  that the composition  of the agency  itself
matters. As discussed  by Wilson  (1989),  we can isolate  three different  types of regulators;  the so-called
Icareerists,"  who are more likely  to move  to the industry  they regulate  once they have finished  their
tenure in the civil service;  the "professionals,"  who are former industry  managers  willing  to keep some
influence  on the regulatory  process;  and lastly the "politicians,"  who see their civil service  as a first step
before  taking a political position. All these  types respond  to different implicit  incentives. Clearly,  the
two first groups  are more likely  to give a high continuation  value on the fact of colluding  with the firm.
This suggests  that shifting  the balance  of powers  towards  the "politicians" within  the regulatory  agency
itself is optimal,  which is not quite consistent  with the standard  recommendations  given  by practitioners,
as suggested  by the overview  prepared  by Smith  (1996). Alternatively,  playing on the tenures of the
bureaucrats  helps to fight capture. Short-term  involvement  in the civil service should  nevertheless  be
traded off with the gain of longer  lasting  relationships  like a better learning of the industry  conditions.
46  Martimort  (1997)18
4.3.5.  Limited Commitment and the Degree of Honesty of the Policymakers
Simple  "constitutions"  which limit  the intertemporal  mandates  of a government  can be used as
constraints  to prevent  capture. 47 At the time of designing  the constitution,  the "founding  fathers"  have  to
decide whether  a government  should  be able to bind the future  of society  to a given  policy or whether
they should  be given  the regulatory  rights only for a shorter  periods. The  cost of commitment  is that a
badly composed  government  could extract  more rent from its ability  to commit. Instead,  short-term
mandates  are such that a badly  composed  government  can be replaced  with some probability  by an
honest one that is more willing  to prevent  capture  with the industry. Political competition  acts as a
potential  threat of regulatory  capture. The cost of short-term  contracts is, instead,  that they are prone to
the standard  hold up problem. 48 Firms underinvest  if they are ex  post expropriated  from their
investment  at the time of change  in the regulatory  policy.
When  the political decision  maker is, in all likelihood,  dishonest,  the optimal  complete
intertemporal  contract  or constitution  calls for collusion-proof  regulatory  mechanisms. Instead,  when
dishonesty  is less likely, letting  collusion  happen  is optimal since it leads to an avoidance  of paying  the
costs of an increase  in the firm's  budget  to fight collusion. This outcome  can also be implemented  as a
simple  constitution  which chooses  ex ante between  long-term  and short-term  contracting. In particular,
a more efficient  technology  of collusion,  i.e., a lower  transaction  cost of capture, calls for the choice of
short-term  contracts. Indeed,  the dead-weight  loss due to capture is less important  under short-term
contracting. This result is reinforced  by Olsen and Torsvick  (1995),  who show that the benefits  of
offering  a sequence  of two short-term  contracts  with respect  to writing  a long-term  contract  increases
with the transaction  costs of side-contracting.  A more efficient  ex post capture induces  a tougher
reaction  of the political  principal  and the regulatory  stake is strongly  reduced. In other  words,  there is
an implicit  competition  between  the political  principal  for the second period  and the regulator  when  they
make deals  with the interest group. An increase  in the efficiency  of side-contracting  hardens  this
competition. By playing  the bureaucracy  against  a political principal  who is unable  to commit  helps  to
improve  welfare. The increase  in the efficiency  of the bureaucracy  becomes  a commitment  device. 49
Collusion-proofness  calls for little discretion  and this is good  when only short-term  contracts  can be
written.
4.3.4.  Delegation and Decentralization
One largely  unanswered  question  in the theory of government  remains  its optimal  degree  of
decentralization.  The shrinking  share of the government  sector  in all western economies,  the failures  of
the socialist  economies,  and the discussion  of the costs and benefits  of federalism  are all evidence  that
this debate  is very current.  50
The Folklore  of the Public Economics  literature  argues that decentralization  is good  because it
allows local powers  entitled  with regulatory  rights to use their local information  to improve  the
47 Laffont and Tirole (1993),  Chapter  16
48 See Williamson  (1975)  et Grossman  and Hart  (1986).
49 Sappington  (1987)  builds a related  model.
50 See Stiglitz  (1994,  Chapter  10) for a discussion  of the centralization  versus  decentralization  problems  in this context.19
provision  of regulation,  redistribution,  or the production  of public  good at the local level. The standard
argument  is that these benefits  of decentralization  must be traded off against  the costs coming  from the
lack of coordination  in the regulatory  policies of the competing  states. Externalities  arise from this
decentralized  exercise of regulatory  rights. 51
This argument  is at best incomplete  because  it implicitly  assumes  that local principals  are
unable to communicate  the information  they learned  at the local level to the upper level of the
regulatory  hierarchy. If such communications  were available,  a grand and centralized  mechanism
would be enough  to coordinate  all  jurisdictions. Moreover,  under seemingly  innocuous  assumptions
like risk-neutrality,  unrelated  local shocks and acceptance  of the federal contracts  at the interim  stage,
i.e.,  after that local governments  have learned  their own information,  there are decentralized  ways of
implementing  the optimal  coordinated  regulatory  policy. With a convenient  set of budget  allocations
and grants at the local level, the Federal level can achieve  the efficient  policy by letting  local
jurisdictions  have  the forrnal  authority  for implementing  local regulation. 52
There are three possible  ways  to prove the optimality  of decentralized  structures.  The first
argues that the main benefit of decentralization  comes  from the ability of the local governments  to
collude  with specific interest groups  at the local levels. 53 This collusion  is indeed  socially  optimal
because  it allows the overall contractual  arrangement  to use the shared information  of the local
behavior  to improve  on the centralized  arrangement. Capture  is not a curse for society,  but on the
contrary,  it allows regulatory  contracts  to be completed. 54 A second  solution  is to recognize  that
implicitly,  communication  between  the local and the centralized  governments  is assumed  to be limited
because,  for instance,  the so-called  revelation  mechanisms  are not available.  55  Contracts  are then
incomplete. The mere existence  of a communication  constraint  creates the scope for collusion  at the
local level between  the regulated  firm and its regulator. The structural  asymmetry  that decentralization
introduces  between  these two layers  of the hierarchy  helps the central  level use the local regulators  to
complete  their regulatory  contract. A third, less normative,  perspective  about the optimal  organization
argues  that delegation  may also help in the case  of non-benevolent  political principals  elected  through
voting procedures. The basic idea is that the optimal  organization  trades off the incentive  costs of
decentralization  (modeled as a moral hazard  problem  between  the local regulators  and the centralized
one) and the benefits of decentralization,  which is a better representation  of the preferences  of the local
median  voter by the local elected  principals.
51 We do not aim here at discussing the huge literature which, following Tiebout  (1955), has analyzed these externalities.
Few of these papers have really taken the  agency perspective which is necessary to an institutional analysis.  Klibanoff and
Morduch (1994) is a valuable exception. They provide a model of decentralization based on informational constraints and
discuss the meaning of residual regulatory rights in this context. Additional ideas are discussed in Estache, A., ed.,
Decentralizing Infrastructure, Advantages and Limitations", World Bank Discussion Paper, 290.
52  Baron and Besanko (1992) and Moockherjee and Reichelstein (1996) show this result in the context  of the theory of the
firm.
53 Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1996)
54 See Itoh (1993) for this point in the framework of the theory of the firm.
55 See Maskin (1976). Also, Laffont and Martimort (1995) takes explicitly this route and model collusion and limits of
communication altogether.20
5. Lessons  for a pragmatic  approach  to the design of regulatory  institutions
Table 1 summarizes  the main discussions  covered  in this paper. It suggests  that there is a
reasonable  degree  of consensus  between  practitioners  and theorists  on many of the issues  covered  here.
In a nutshell,  everyone  seems to agree  that utility  regulation  has to promote  (static and dynamic)
efficiency  while it protects  consumers  from potential  monopolist  abuses, and investors  and operators
from political influence. Everybody  also agrees  that there is a trade-off  between  the credibility  of the
regulatory  commitments  and the flexibility  required  to rebalance,  as needed,  the interests  of the various
actors. Some degree of flexibility  is desirable  but the track record  of governments  in their use of
flexibility  is generally  perceived  as being  so problematic  that the rules built in the various privatization
instruments  are designed  to limit this flexibility.
Since  some degree of discretion  is always  available  since regulatory  contracts cannot  foresee  all
future  occurrences,  safeguards  are needed.  One of the key components  of these safeguard  mechanisms
analyzed,  in some detail,  by practitioners  is the specific  design of regulatory  institutions. One of the key
points made  in this paper is that these safeguards  sometimes  reflect and sometimes  imply transaction
costs which influence  or should influence  the optimal  rent-efficiency  trade-off  in ways which are
sometimes  ignored  by practitioners.
The first set of generic issues  practitioners  usually  cover on institutional  design is the
importance  of the independence,  autonomy,  and accountability  of the regulatory  institutions  for the
sustainability  of the reforms of regulated  sectors. Most  of the literature  on transaction  costs due to
government  failures  covered  here would  agree with the need to meet these  three criteria. It would,
however,  emphasize  that the way in which the criteria are met is determined  by the way in which  the
transaction  costs  are minimized,  and this in turn drives the desirable  design of the regulatory  framework.
The time dimension,  for instance,  is crucial. In practice, it means that if there are commitment
problems,  short term institutional  contracts  between  the various  players  are more likely  to ensure
independence  and autonomy.  This has an impact  on the duration of the nomination  of the regulators.
Short  term contract  may be better, yet typically,  contracts  for regulators  are between  4 and 8 years and
often  with possibilities  of renewal.
But the empirical  debate on the design  of the regulators'  job goes further and this is a potential
source  of tension. According  to one of the schools  of thought  discussed  above,  it would seem  that what
practitioners  typically  recommend  - i.e. that ensuring  that the regulators  are appointed  on the basis of
professional  rather  political criteria  - may not be the optimal  strategy  to minimize  capture since  the
professional  experts  are likely to come  from the sector  they are supposed  to regulate  and are likely  to
return  to it sooner  or later. This is the case in most developing  countries  for instance. Most
practitioners  would reply  that the idea of electing  regulators  may be just as dangerous  in developing
countries. Unless  the democratic  process  is well oiled and has the required  transparency  and
accountability,  elected regulators  are unlikely  to be much more independent  than professional
regulators;  they will simply  represent  different interests.  What is interesting  to note however  is that
while practitioners  and theorists  emphasize  different  sources  of capture, both agree  that one way of
dealing  with this risk of capture  is to ensure  that the selection  process  involves  both the executive  and
the legislative  branches.Table 1: Summary  of the main  approaches  to minimize  transaction  costs in the design of regulatory frameworks
Impact on regulatory  outcome if  not laken  into account  Hlow  to minimize  transaction  costs
Lack of commitment  of government  * with more info in 2nd period regulatory  want to improve incentive  * "overincentivate"  in period I
and need  for renegotiation  * this reduces incentive  for efficiency  in 1  st period  * maintain flexibility to renegotiate  to avoid overbinding  commitments
to private operators
Multiprincipal  Nature of  * allocative  inefficiency:  because of horizontal  coordination  problems, more or  * improve  information  and monitoring (formal  yardstick competition
Government  less incentive  will be a useful tool)
* sub-optimal  degree of decentralization  and vertical  coordination  problems:  cuts  * reduce number of players
efficiency  rent to firms  and move  towards cost plus regime
* too low incentives  build in contract  when multiple  regulators  cover
complementary  activities because  of overregulation  * let regulators  share information  to soften  their competition
* too much incentives  build in contract  when multiple  regulators  cover substitutes
activities because  of regulatory  competition  * let regulators  share information  to soften their competition
* sequentiality  of regulatory  decisions  matter:
*give a veto right to head of state or institutions  to which regulators  are
accountable  to
Discretion  of Political  Principal  *  structure driven  direction  of incentives  because  they drive the distribution  of  * how to fix structures?  separation?
power of interest  groups  * fix process  by specifying  decision making processes (including  voting
*  politician  favor median  voter rather  than majority of voters  mechanism  to ensure proper representation  in decision making
process)
suboptimal  contracts (average  cost pricing or quota) can be useful ways
of tying the hands of politicians
Discretion  of Regulator  * internal influences:  wages and promotions  can be used to alter rent distribution;  * increase accountability  (disseminate information  through any which
increase internal  incentive  to perform  to reduce  external  influence  and risk of  way it is possible; including  the media but this requires also educating
collusion  the media)
* conflict between  legislative  and  regulators; need to reduce rent to cut risks of
collusion
. regulatory  dynamics:  side payments
* cut rent and move towards cost- plus
* fix structures  to reduce risksAutonomy covers various issues.  Practitioners will generally argue that agencies need to have
access to their own funding sources.  Relying on budgetary transfers decided by politicians is often viewed
as a threat to the independence of the regulators since an easy way to reduce the effectiveness of a regulator
would be to cut its budgetary allocation.  Levies on the regulated firms or the consumers of the regulated
services are the most common alternatives, and can be viewed as user fees to be paid for the protection
services provided by the regulators. To some extent, the regulatory fee approach also increases the
accountability of the regulators since there is a more direct link between the source of their financing and
what is expected from them. 56
But autonomy has to be more than just financial. It should also mean that the regulator can recruit its
own staff.  The achievement of staffing autonomy will often require an exemption from civil service salary
and recruitment rules.  It may also imply that these agencies have to be able to recruit external consultants
when the required skills are not available locally to address specific needs.  Autonomy in monitoring of
compliance and enforcement deserves to be highlighted because it requires that specific instruments be
assigned to the regulators. This match between instruments and institutions is also a recurring theme
addressed by the theoretical literature,  which does not provide closure, so  there is little policy advise that be
drawn beyond what practitioners have to say. To be effective in his role, the regulator must be able to impose
penalties according to clearly defined rules. This is consistent with the emphasis on simple transparent rules
that emerged from the literature reviewed in the paper.  The other theme addressed here is that there is an
ideal sequence in the decision-making process that depends on the distribution of information among the
actors
Both practitioners and theoreticians agree that accountability requires transparency in the decision
making process, which is unfortunately too often counterintuitive to many bureaucrats. It also requires an
operating environment subject to simple and clear procedural rules, including stipulated deadlines for
reaching decisions, detailed justifications  of decisions, non-political reviews of decisions, opportunities for
all concerned parties to be heard through public hearings (and hence greater interactions with consumer
defense groups), and venues for appeal and provisions permitting removal of regulators in case of proven
misbehavior.  The practical challenge, however, is no longer the staffing.  The challenge is to ensure that the
information generated by this process is relevant to allowing the required accountability.  This is,
unfortunately, not the case in many countries since process oriented regulators tend to deal with details that
have little to do with the distribution of the rent generated by the private or public monopolies providing
utilities services.  They deal with the formal regulatory issues rather than the real regulatory issues.  In  this
case, transparency requirements become an alibi rather than an instrument that can be used by regulators.
Finally, practitioners tend to discuss their views on the optimal number of agencies.  For all or most
infrastructure sectors, they tend to recommend the creation of multisectoral agencies, i.e. a single regulatory
agency as in the case of state-level regulators in the US, Canada and Australia, and national regulators in
Costa Rica and Jamaica, rather than a sector or industry specific agency.  This is one of the
recommendations that appears to be at odds with what theory suggests.  The case for some degree of
separation of regulatory roles is made strongly by many of the papers surveyed here (but not too much since
this can lead to unclear and complex overlapping of divisions of responsibilities).  This apparent
inconsistency can be reconciled in two ways.  First,  the practitioners'  concern with the need to share
regulatory resources (regulatory economists and lawyers, etc.) to deal with the limited regulatory capacity is
generally not addressed by the theorists surveyed in this paper since their focus in on the US or the UK,
56 Also, there  are potential  problems  here too since  regulation  is a public  good  and this will probably  lead  to some  degree  of free
riding.probably the largest producers of "regulatory skills". 57 Second, the fact that some degree of overlapping of
responsibilities is unavoidable (e.g. the regulation of environmental issues typically involves multiple
government institutions) guarantees that the gains achieved through some degree of separation are achieved.
Considered jointly, the impact of transaction costs resulting from the difficulties involved in
organizing governments often imply that less rent and less incentive needs to be built into the regulatory
frameworks if transaction costs in general and collusion problems in particular are to minimized.  This is an
important conclusion since it rejoins the recommendation from theory on the optimal strategy to deal with
excessively high risk levels in privatization projects.  There seems to be some truth that there can be too
much of a good thing when considering the appropriate level of incentives to build into regulatory regimes.
57 Exceptions include  Spiller and Levy and Spiller (1993), Guasch and Spiller (1997),  and Kahn and Kessides (1997)References
Alchian, A. and Demsetz, 1972, "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization", American Economic
Review, 62: 777-795
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole, 1997, "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 105: 1-29
Atkinson, C., and J. Stiglitz, 1980, Lectures in Public Economics, Mc Graw and Hill, London.
Baron D., and  R. Myerson, 1982, Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,  Econometrica, 50: 911-930.
Baron, D., 1985, "Non-Cooperative  Regulation of a Non-Localized Externality," Rand Journal of Economics, 16: 269-
282.
Baron, D.  1989, "Regulation and Legislative Choice", Rand Journal of Economics, 20: 467-477.
Baron D., and D. Besanko,  1992, "Information, Control, and Organizational Structure", Joumal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 1: 237-276.
Baron, D., 1995, "The Economics and Politics of Regulation: Perspectives, Agencies and Approaches", in Banks and
Hanushek, Modern Political Economy,  1-60.
Becker, G., 1983, "A  Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal  of
Economics, 98: 371-400.
Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston, 1986, "Common Agency," Econometrica, 54: 923-943.
Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston, 1987, "Menu  Auctions, Resource Allocations, andEconomic Influence," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 101: 1-31.
Bernstein, M.,1955, Regulatory Business by Independent Commissions. Princeton, University Press, Princeton.
Buchanan, J.,] 1980, "Rent-Seeking  under External Diseconomies," in Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking  Society,
ed. J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock. College Station: Texas A end M Press.
Coase, R., 1937, "The  Nature of the Firm," Economica, 4: 386-405.
Congleton R., 1984, Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort, Journal of Public Economics, 25: 197-209.
Cremer, J., A. Estache and P. Seabright 1996,"Decentralizing Public Services: what can we learn from the Theory of the
Firm?", Revue d'Economie Politique,  106 (1).
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin, 1979, "The  Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Review of Economic
Studies, 46: 185-216.
Dewatripont, M., 1989,  Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time," Quarterly Journal of  Economy,  103: 589-
620.
Dewatripont M., and E. Maskin, 1995, Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, Review of
Economic Studies, 62: 541-555.
Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole, 1994, "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder
Congruence," Quarterly Journal of  Economics, 109: 1027-1054.
Dixit, A., 1996, The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective,MIT Press, Cambridge.
Downs, A., 1967, Inside Bureaucracy, Little Brown and Company, Boston.
Estache, A. (1997), "Designing Regulatory Institutions for Infrastructure -Lessons from Argentina", Viewpoint No 1  14,
Private Sector Development Department, The World Bank Group.Estache,  A., ed., 1995,  "Decentralizing  Infrastructure,  Advantages  and Limitations",  World  Bank Discussion  Paper,  290.
Ferejohn,  J., 1986,  Incumbent  Performance  and Electoral  Control",  Public  Choice,  86, 5-26
Fudenberg,  D. and D. Levine, 1989,  "Reputation  and Equilibrium  Selection  in Games  with  a Patient  Player,"
Econometrica,  57: 759-778.
Fudenberg,  D., D. Levine  and E. Maskin,  1994,  "The Folk Theorem  with  Imperfect  Public  Information,"  Econometrica,
62: 997-1039.
Greenwald,  and J. Stiglitz,  1986, "Externalities  in Economies  with  Imperfect  Information  and Incomplete  Markets,"
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  101:  229-264.
Grossman,  G. and E. Helpman,  1994,  "Protection  for Sale,"  American  Economic  Review  84: 833-850.
Grossman,  G. and E. Helpman,  1996,  "  Electoral  Competition  and Special  Interest  Politics,"  Review  of Economic  Studies
63: 265-286.
Grossman,  S. and 0. Hart, 1986,  "The Costs  and Benefits  of Ownership:  A Theory  of Lateral  and Vertical  Integration,"
Journal  of Political Economy,  94: 691-719.
Guasch,  J.L  and P. Spiller, 1997, Managing  the Regulatory  Process:  Design,  Concepts,  Issues  and the Latin  American  and
Caribbean  Story", mimeo
Hart, 0. and J. Tirole, 1988,  "Contract  Renegotiation  and Coasian  Dynamics  ", Review  of Economic  Studies,  45: 509-
540.
Helpman  (1997),  "Politics  and Trade Policy",  in Kreps,  eds., Advances  in Economics  and Economietrics:  Theory  and
Applications",  19-45
Holmstrom,  B, 1982,  "Moral  Hazard  in  Teams",  Bell Journal  of Economics,  10:  74-91
Holmstrom,  B. and J. Tirole,] 1988,  ","  in Handbook  of Industrial  Organization,  vol 2, Chapter: -.
Homlstrom,  B. and P. Milgrom,  1991,  "Multitask Principal  Agent Analyses:lncentive  Contracts,  Asset  Ownership,  and
Job  Design,"  Journal  of Law, Economic  and Organization,  7: 24-52.
Huntington,  S., 1966,  "The Marasmus  of the ICC: The  Commission,  the Railroad  and the Public  Interests"  in P. Woll,  ed.,
Public  Administration  Policy:  Selected  Essays. Harper  and Row, New-York.
Itoh,  H., 1993,  "Coalitions,  Incentives,  and Risk Sharing,"  Journal  of Economic  Theory,  60: 410-427.
Kahn,  A., 1988,  The  Economics  of Regulation:  Principles  and Institutions, 2nd edition,  MIT Press,  Cambridge.
Kiewert,  D. and M. McCubbins,  1991,  The Logic  of Delegation:  Congressional  Parties  and the Appropriations  Process,
Chicago  University  Press,  Chicago.
Kofman  F., and J. Lawarree  1993,  Collusion  in Hierarchical  Agency,  Econometrica,  61: 629-656.
Kydland,  F. and E. Prescott,  1977,  "Rules  rather  than Discretion:  The  Inconsistency  of Optimal  Plans",  Journal  of Political
Economy,  85, 3.
Laffont  J.J., 1994,  The  New Regulatory  Economics:  Ten  Years  After,  Econometrica,  62: 507-538.
Laffont,  J.J. and D. Martimort,  1995,  "Separation  of Regulators  against  Collusive  Behavior,"  mimeo  IDEI.
Laffont,  J.J., 1995,  "Industrial  Policy  and Politics",  International  Journal  of Industrial  Organization,  14: 1-27Laffont, ).J. and D. Martimort,  1998, "Collusion  and Delegation," forthcoming Rand Journal of Economics.
Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole, 1990, "Adverse  Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of  Economic Studies,
75: 597-626.
Laffont J.J., and J. Tirole, 1991, The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, Quarterly
Journal of  Economics, 107: 1089-1127.
Laffont J.J. and J. Tirole,  1992,"Should  Government Commit?,"  European Economic Review, 36: 345-353.
Laffont J.J. and J. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Landes W., and R. Posner, 1975, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspectives, Journal of Law and
Economics, 18: 875-901.
Landis J., 1960, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President Elected, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Committee Print.
Lewis, T. and D. Sappington, 1991,"Oversight  of Long--Term Investment by Short--Lived Regulators," International
Economic Review, 32: 579-600.
Lierson, A., 1946, "Interest  Groups in Administration," in F. Morstein Marx, ed.,  Elements of Public Administration.
Prentice Hall,  New-York.
Martimort, D., 1992, "Multi-Principaux  avec Anti-Selection," Annales d'Economie et de Statistiques, 28: 1-38.
Martimort, D., 1996a, "Exclusive  Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipal Incentive Theory", Rand Journal of
Economics, 27: 1-31.
Martimort, D., 1996b, "The  Multiprincipal Nature of the Government," European  Economic Review, 40: 673-685.
Martimort, D.1997a, "A Theory of Collusive Behavior", Scandinavian Journal of Economics,  99, 555-579.
Martimort, D. 1997b, "The  Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs", mimeo
Martimort, D. and L. Stole, 1997, "A Note on the Revelation Principle in Common Agency Games," mimeo
Martimort, D., 1998, "Renegotitation Design with Multiple Regulators", mimeo IDEI, Toulouse.
McAfee, P. and J. McMillan, 1995, "Organizational Diseconomies of Scope," Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy 4: 399-426.
McCubbins, R., R. Noll and B. Weingast, 1987, "Administrative  Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3: 243-277.
McCubbins, R., R. Noll and B. Weingast, 1989, "Structure  and Process, Politics and Policy: Administration Arrangements
and the Political Control of Agencies," Virginia Law Review, 75: 431-482.
Melumad, N.,  D. Mookherjee, and S. Reichelstein, 1995, "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," Rand
Journal of Economics, 26: 654-692.
Meyrson, R., 1997, "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions", in Kreps, ed., Advances in Economics and
Economietrics: Theory and Application, Seventh World Congress, 46-65.
Miller J.,  W. Shughart and  R. Tollison, 1984, "A Note on Centralized Regulatory Review," Public Choice, 43: 83-88.
Mirrlees J., 1971, "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,"
Review of Economic Studies, 38: 175-208.
Moe, T., 1984, "The  New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science, 28: 739-777.Moe T., 1986, "Interests,  Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Policies of the NLRB,"  Studies of American Political
Department.
Myerson, R., 1979, "Incentive  Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 47: 61-73.
Neven D.,  R. Nutall and  P. Seabright, 1993,Regulatory Capture and The Design of European Merger Policy, in Merger in
Daylight, eds.; Neven D., R. Nutall and P. Seabright, CEPR Press, London.
Niskanen, W., 1971, Bureaucracy and Representative Government,  Aldine-Atherton, New-York.
Olsen, T. and G. Torsvick, 1993a, "The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Privatization and
Regulation," Journal of Law, Economic and Organization, 9: 136-158.
Olsen, T. and G. Torsvick, 1993b, "Collusion  and Ratcheting in Hierarchies," mimeo, Norvegian Research Center in
Organization and Management.
Olsen, T. and  G. Torsvick, 1995, "Intertemporal  Common Agency and Organizational Design: How much
Centralization," European Economic Review, 39: 1405-1428.
Olson, M., 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: A Theory of Interest Groups in Public Goods,  Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
Olson, M., 1982, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities, Yale University
Press, New Haven.
Peltzman, S., 1976, "Towards  a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 19: 211-240.
Posner, R., 1976, "Theories  of Economic Regulation,"  Bell Journal of Economics, 5: 335-358.
Qian, Y. and G. Roland, 1994, "Regional Decentralization and the Soft Budget Constraint: The Case of China," mimeo
ULB Bruxelles.
Salant, D., 1995, "Behind  the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation," Rand Journal of Economics,
26: 362-377.
Salant, D. and G. Woroch,  1992, "Trigger  Price Regulation," Rand Journal of Economics, 23: 29-51.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1993, "Corruption,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 599-617.
Smith, W. (1996), "Utility Regulators: Creating Agencies in Reforming and Developing Countries", paper presented to the
International Forum for Utility Regulators, Oxford, England, June.
Spiller, P., 1991, "Politician,  Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or
"Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics 33:  65-101.
Levy, B. and P. Spiller (1993), "Regulation, Institutions and Commitment in Telecommunications: A Comparative
Analysis of Five Country Studies", Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, May 3-4, The World Bank.
Stigler, G., 1971, "The  Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, 2: 3-21.
Stole, L., 1990, "Mechanism  Design under Common Agency," mimeo, University of Chicago.
Tirole, J., 1986, "Hierarchies  and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economic
and Organization, 2: 181-214.
Tirole, J., 1992, "Collusion  and the Theory of Organizations," in Advances in Economic Theory, vol. 2 , ed. J.J. Laffont,
151-206. Cambridge University Press.
Tirole, J., 1994, "The  Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers 46:  1-29.Williamson, O., 1975, Markets and Hierarchies, Free Press.
Williamson, O., 1985, The Economic Institution of Capitalism.
Wilson, J., 1989, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It., Basic Books, New YorkPolicy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2059  Financial  Intermediation  and  Growth: Ross  Levine  February  1999  K. Labrie
Causality  and Causes  Norman  Loayza  31001
T'horsten Beck
WPS2060  The Macroeconomics  of Delayed  Daniel  Kaufmann  February  1999  D. Bouvet
Exchange-Rate  Unification:  Theory  Stephen  A. O'Connell  35818
And Evidence  from Tanzania
WPS2061  A Framework  for Regulating  Hannie  van Greuning  February  1999  A. Thornton
Microfinance Institutions  Joselito  Gallardo  80409
Bikki  Randhawa
WPS2062 Does  Financial  Reform  Increase  Oriana  Bandiera  February  1999  A. Yaptenco
or Reduce  Savings?  Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.  38526
Patrick  Honohan
Fabio  Schiantarelli
WPS2OC3  The Practice  of Access  Pricing:  Tomrnmasso  M. Vailetti  February  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Telecommunications  in the United  36370
Kingdom
WPS2064 Regulating  Privatized  Rail  Transport  Javier  Campos  February  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
Pedr.,o  Cantos  36370
WPS2065 Exporting,  Externalities,  and  Howard  Pack  February  1999  C. Bernardo
echnology  Transfer  Kamal  Saggi  31148
WPS2D6S  Flight  Capital as a Portfolio  Choice  Paul  Collier  February  1999  A. Kitson-Walters
Anke Hoeffler  33712
Catherine  Pattillo
WPS2067 Multinational  Firms and  Technology  Amy Jocelyn  Glass  February  1999  L. Tabada
T ransfer  Kamnal  Saggi  36896
WPS2068  Quitting  and Labor  Turnover:  Tom Krebs  February  1999  T. Gomez
Microeconomic  Evidence  and  Wiiliam F. Maloney  32127
Macroeconomic  Consequences
WPS20O9  Logit Analysis  in a Rotating  Panel  Patriclo  Aroca GonzAlez  February  1999  T. Gomez
Context  and an Application  io  WiUi,  F  vlonay  32127
Self-Employment Decisions
WVPS2070  Tha Search  for the Key: Aid,  De.v;d  Dollar  March 1999  E. Khine
Investment,  and Policies in Africa  WilliEam  Easterly  37471
WPS2071 The  World Bank's  Unified  Suivey  Joe Varbeek  M3arch  1999  M. Galatis
Projections: How  Accurate Are  31177
, hey? An Ex-Post Evaluation of
US91-US97Policy Research  Working Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2072  Growth, Poverty,  and Inequality:  Quentin  T. Wodon  March  1999  J. Badami
A Regional  Panel  for Bangladesh  80425